Updating diagram

This commit is contained in:
DarkFeather 2022-04-19 11:58:53 -05:00
parent 3218a08c1d
commit 8a339a1255
Signed by: DarkFeather
GPG Key ID: 1CC1E3F4ED06F296
1 changed files with 23 additions and 19 deletions

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@ -2,22 +2,28 @@ Access layout looks something like the below:
```
Internet
└── Shadowfeed
<> 10.0.1.0
│   ├── Core
<> 10.0.1.0 -- Internal Subnet
│   ├<> Core
^   │   ├── Darknet
│   │   ├── Geth-Hub-N
│   │   ├── Foundation
│   │   ├── Geth
│   │   │ ├── Geth-Hubs
│   │   │ ├── Geth-Eyes
│   │   │ └── IoT API's
│   │   ├── IRC
│   │   ├── Maat
│   │   ├── MaatBuilder
│   │   └── Sharingan
│   └── Nazara
├── 10.0.2.0
│   ├── Chamberlain
^   ├── iRobot
│   └── Nest
└── 10.0.3.0
├── Games
├── Tachikoma
└── Tricorder
│   │   ├── Password
│   │   ├── Sharingan
│   │   ├── Singularity
│   │   ├── WolfPack
│   │   └── Yggdrasil
│   ├<> Nazara
│   ├<─ Chromecasts
│   └<─ User devices
└── 10.0.2.0 -- IoT Subnet
   ├── Chamberlain Garage Door
   ├── iRobot Housekeeping
   └── Nest Thermostat
```
For more details on what runs on what host, look to [AniNIX/Ubiqtorate](/AniNIX/Ubiqtorate), particularly the `playbooks/deploy.yml` file, and the network traffic captured in [AniNIX/Sharingan](https://sharingan.aninix.net/).
@ -26,14 +32,12 @@ The general idea here is thus:
* 10.0.1.0/24 is the service subnet, with NAT access from Shadowfeed creating a pseudo-secured DMZ for other AniNIX-controlled machines.
* SSH and HTTPS access is then filtered through the NAT controls -- typically, traffic passes through Core to ensure the right security headers get set and only the approved applications get accessed.
* This also assists in letting Core's network IDS and IPS capture threat data for Sharingan.
* It also assists in that
* 10.0.2.0/24 is the vendor subnet -- machines here get external access but no access to any host not themselves in 10.0.0.0/8.
* 10.0.3.0/24 is the user subnet -- machines here can access the external world and 10.0.1.0/24 but not 10.0.2.0/24.
* It also assists in that we have a central location for WAF and SSL.
* 10.0.2.0/24 is the vendor subnet -- machines here get external access but no access to any host not themselves in 10.0.0.0/8. Their DNS is also routed into
* Other 10.0.0.0/8 subnets are reserved for testing.
Ideally, only the following external ports are open:
* 22/tcp/ssh to Core, for read-write access
* 443/tcp/https to Core, for read-only access
* 6697/tcp/ircs to Core, for communication access
* Some external NAT port for bastion access to Nazara.
This ideal isn't currently met, due to some application limitations, but we're working on it.